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THE AMATEUR SPORTS DRAFT: THE
BEST MEANS TO THE END?
JEFFREY A. ROSENTHAL'
I. INTRODUCTION
One area of sports with potential antitrust concerns has been the am-
ateur sports draft. All four major sports - baseball, football, basketball,
and hockey - use similar draft mechanisms. Depending on the caliber
of players eligible in a given year, the draft (and even the pre-draft lot-
tery in basketball and, now, hockey) can provide much drama and pub-
licity. Every so often, either a player, an agent or a member of the
media questions the legality of the draft. Rumored changes in the draft
or alternative proposals are regularly reported.
The dilemma over whether to endorse or condemn the amateur draft
is that the draft has both positive and negative aspects. One's opinion of
the legality of the draft often depends on how one balances these pros
and cons. The major positive aspect of the draft, and the primary justifi-
cation for it, is that the draft provides a way to distribute talent to teams
and its goal is to do so both fairly and in such a way so as to maintain a
competitive balance. On the other hand, the draft distorts the free mar-
ket and eliminates the choice of amateurs to decide where they want to
play and with whom to negotiate.'
In recent years, the amateur drafts of all four major sports have come
under greater scrutiny, either for changes implemented in the draft or
for actions taken by specific individuals. Major League Baseball (MLB)
relatively recently changed its draft to eliminate the primary leverage
which high school players held - the old rule permitted teams to hold
exclusive rights to drafted players for only one year (thus allowing play-
ers the alternative of going to college to use as leverage in contract nego-
* A.B. 1989, Dartmouth College, cum laude; J.D. 1992, Harvard Law School, magna cum
laude. Currently, Mr. Rosenthal is associated with the law firm of Cleary, Gottlieb, Steen and
Hamilton in New York, New York. Mr. Rosenthal is also author of The Football Answer to the
Baseball Problem: Can Revenue Sharing Work?, 5 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 419 (1995). The
author wishes to thank Paul Weiler, the Henry J. Friendly Professor of Law at Harvard Law
School, and Jennifer Rosenthal for their assistance.
1. A standard analogy, repeated so regularly by some lawyers and agents, is a system in
which an attorney graduates from law school and is drafted by, and forced to work for, a law
firm in Biloxi, Mississippi, rather than a firm in San Francisco for whom the lawyer wants to
work. See, e.g., Leigh Steinberg, Negotiating Contracts in the National Football League, C627
A.L.I.-A.B.A. 617, 619-20 (1991).
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tiations); the new rule created a substantially longer period of time (until
after college graduation) during which the teams would hold exclusive
negotiating rights. This change effectively removed the threat that had
resulted in huge signing bonuses for college-eligible players such as
Brien Taylor and Todd Van Poppel. In response to the implementation
of this change, however, the Major League Baseball Players Association
(MLBPA) successfully challenged the new rule, and won an arbitration
decision, forcing the change to be discarded.
The National Basketball Association (NBA) has changed its draft in
recent years. The basketball draft, resulting from the collective bargain-
ing agreement which was initially upheld in Robertson v. National Bas-
ketball Association,' was modified to restrict it to merely two rounds (for
a total of only fifty-four - now fifty-eight after expansion to Toronto
and Vancouver - players).3 All other players are free agents and may
negotiate with any team. The players wanted a shorter draft so each
marginal player could negotiate as a free agent, thus having a greater
chance of making a team since he can try out for any team that may need
him rather than only the team that drafts him. Furthermore, if any of
these undrafted free agents makes a team, he might have greater lever-
age to sign a more lucrative contract. Another major recent change con-
cerning the NBA draft is that college underclassmen who enter the draft
now have the option of returning to college to play basketball, so long as
they elect to do so within thirty days of the draft.4 In such a circum-
stance, the drafting team retains exclusive negotiating rights for one ad-
ditional year.
The National Football League (NFL), which has had the notoriety of
losing the only case directly challenging the legality of a professional
sports draft, Smith v. Pro-Football, Inc.,6 has undergone significant
change. Following the 1989 draft, the NFL changed its longstanding pol-
icy that underclassmen are only eligible to be drafted upon demonstra-
tion of "hardship" and implemented a new policy whereby all players
who were at least three years out of high school were eligible to be
2. 72 F.R.D. 64 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), affd, 556 F.2d 682 (2d Cir. 1977).
3. Collective Bargaining Agreement between the NBA and the National Basketball Play-
ers Association (NBPA), Art. IV, § 1(a) (Nov. 1, 1988)[hereinafter NBA AoREmENT].
Under the new collective bargaining agreement reached in September 1995, the NBA's ama-
teur draft will be shortened to one round beginning in 1998. See Murray Chass, Stem Works
Magic and Keeps His Perfect Mark, N.Y. TIMms, Sept. 13, 1995, at B22.
4. Tim Layden, Leap of Faith, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED, Aug. 28, 1995, at 104, 109.
5. Id.
6. 420 F. Supp. 738 (D.D.C. 1976), aff'd in part, 593 F.2d 1173 (D.C. Cir. 1978).
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drafted. Unlike with basketball, however, college underclassmen who
enter the NFL draft are ineligible to return to play college football.'
Furthermore, following a string of litigation losses and a disastrous
players' strike in 1987, the National Football League Players Association
(NFLPA) decertified on November 6, 1989.9 After another round of
lawsuits, the NFLPA recertified on March 30, 1993 ° and a new collec-
tive bargaining agreement was reached on May 6, 1993 (NFL Agree-
ment). Under the NFL Agreement, the amateur draft was shortened to
seven rounds and a rookie salary cap was implemented."
Finally, the National Hockey League (NHL) draft, previously ig-
nored by nearly all but the most die-hard of Canadian hockey fans, was
thrust into the spotlight thanks to Eric Lindros, the top draft choice in
1991. Lindros, predicted at the time by many to be one of the most
dominating players ever, was originally the subject of an unusual change
in the normal expansion rules. The San Jose Sharks, a new addition to
the NHL in 1991, would have traditionally received the first draft choice.
However, some of the weaker teams in the league, having realized ear-
lier that Lindros would be eligible for the draft in that expansion year
and having recognized his extraordinary ability, threatened to block ex-
pansion unless the draft was changed whereby the worst team in the
league would receive the first pick, San Jose would get the second, and
then the draft would continue normally. This was precisely the change
the NHL made." The Quebec Nordiques received the first pick and
drafted Lindros. Lindros subsequently refused to sign with the team (at
any price), and created a provincial-wide furor (resulting not only from
anger at his rejection of the Nordiques, but also from negative comments
Lindros made about the French-speaking Quebec). Lindros' obstinance
eventually forced the Nordiques to trade him to the Philadelphia Fly-
ers.' 3 The amateur draft was also a significant issue (although it paled in
7. Layden, supra note 4, at 106.
8. Id. at 108.
9. Michael S. Kagnoff, While Free Agents Reap Benefits of NFL Labor Settlement Agree-
ment, Rookies Get Set for Further Legal Battles, 1 SPoRTS LAW. J. 109, 119 (1994).
10. Id. at 121.
11. See NFL AGREEMENT, Art. XVI, § 2.
12. See Jeff Jacobs, Forget Rest; 1979 Draft Best of All, HARTFORD CouRANr, June 27,
1994, at El.
13. Philadelphia, ironically, provided Quebec with such an abundance of young talent in
return for Lindros that Quebec - now the Colorado Avalanche - has become one of the
league's best teams, finishing the 1994-95 season with the Eastern Conference's best record in
the regular season. See Red Fisher, A Little of Everything in Unique Cup Playoffs, MONTREAL
GAZETTE, May 6, 1995, at E3. Philadelphia traded Mike Ricci, Ron Hextall, Peter Forsberg,
Steve Duchesne, Kerry Huffman, Chris Simon, their 1993 and 1994 first round draft choices
19951
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comparison to the salary cap and luxury tax) in the recent NHL players'
strike that cancelled nearly half of the 1994-95 season. As in the other
sports, the players prefered a shorter draft while the owners fought for,
and obtained, a rookie salary cap.
This article will discuss the amateur drafts of the four major team
sports. It will begin with the case of Smith v. Pro Football, Inc. and with
an antitrust analysis of the draft's restraint of trade (which is relevant for
all team sports except baseball, which currently has an antitrust exemp-
tion14). This section will also include a critical look at the Smith decision
and weaknesses in the reasoning of the circuit court. Much of part two
will support the amateur draft and criticize the Smith majority. Part
three will focus on the debate among economists as to whether the ama-
teur draft actually succeeds in promoting a competitive balance. It will
discuss the major problems with the draft and how, in practice, the draft
is not necessarily the best suited means to achieve the leagues' stated
goals. The article will next examine some of the collective bargaining
agreements which have protected the drafts from further legal challenge.
This section will briefly discuss the role of player unions and their right
to negotiate agreements which restrain the trade of those who are not
yet members of the unions (or, in the case of the MLBPA's attack on the
draft modification to extend the exclusivity period, the union's creation
of standing to challenge the change). The fifth section will look at differ-
ent options that have been proposed by the Smith court, various sports-
writers and the leagues themselves and will discuss some of the positive
and negative aspects of each option. Finally, the last section will present
a new proposal for the amateur draft.
II. THE YAzoo SMrriH CASE
The Smith decision, the only one directly attacking the validity of the
amateur draft in any major team sport, 15 held that the NFL draft vio-
(who turned out to be, respectively, Jocelyn Thibault and Nolan Baumgartner) and $15 mil-
lion in cash to Quebec for the rights to Lindros. Chuck Gormley, USA TODAY, May 5, 1995.
14. Baseball's antitrust exemption has come from a trilogy of Supreme Court cases: Fed-
eral Baseball Club of Baltimore, Inc. v. National League of Professional Baseball Clubs, 259
U.S. 200 (1922); Toolson v. New York Yankees, Inc., 346 U.S. 356 (1953); and Flood v. Kuhn,
407 U.S. 258 (1972).
15. In Denver Rockets v. All-Pro Management, Inc., 325 F. Supp. 1049 (C.D. Cal. 1971),
the court granted Spencer Haywood a preliminary injunction forbidding the NBA from deny-
ing him entry in the NBA's amateur draft by reason of his not having graduated from college.
The case was never litigated beyond the injunction stage, but in granting a preliminary injunc-
tion, the court opined that there was a "substantial probability" that the amateur draft was an
"arbitrary and unreasonable restraint" of trade in violation of the antitrust laws. Id at 1056.
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lated the Sherman Act.' 6 As a direct result, the professional sports
leagues (with the exception of baseball which, as noted earlier, is exempt
from the antitrust laws) have been required to elicit the permission of
the player unions to continue their drafts.' 7 The NFL appealed its initial
loss in the district court but was rebuffed by a 2-1 opinion of the D.C.
Circuit affirming the finding of antitrust liability.
Although the district court in Smith found a per se violation of the
Sherman Act by virtue of its belief that the draft constituted an unlawful
"group boycott," the court of appeals rejected that characterization and
held the draft to be invalid under a rule of reason analysis." The circuit
court rejected the trial court's per se condemnation and concluded that
the draft could not constitute a "group boycott" because football teams
are not economic competitors. According to the court, the rule of rea-
son analysis was thus necessary because "courts have consistently re-
fused to invoke the boycott per se rule where, given the peculiar
characteristics of an industry, the need for cooperation among partici-
pants necessitated some type of concerted refusal to deal."' 9 This con-
clusion seems to find support in the subsequent Supreme Court decision
in National Collegiate Athletic Association v. Board of Regents of the
The court in Drysdale v. Florida Team Tennis, Inc., 410 F. Supp. 843 (W.D. Pa. 1976), granted
standing to a tennis player to challenge the draft under the Sherman Act, but never reached
the merits of the claim.
16. The provisions of the Sherman Act that formed the bases of the complaint in Smith
were 15 U.S.C. § 1, which provides that "[e]very contract, combination in the form of trust or
otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal . . . ... and 15 U.S.C. § 3, which reads similarly.
Although not addressed by either the District Court or the D.C. Circuit, Smith's complaint
also alleged a violation of 15 U.S.C. § 2, which provides that "[e]very person who shall mo-
nopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons,
to monopolize any part of the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign
nations, shall be deemed guilty of a felony. .. "
17. The Smith decision obviously affects only the NFL directly, as the NBA and NHL
were not parties to the action, but the latter two leagues have also dealt with draft-related
issues through collective bargaining. See Robertson v. National Basketball Ass'n, 556 F.2d
682 (2d Cir. 1977); Wood v. National Basketball Association, 602 F. Supp. 525 (S.D.N.Y.
1986); Bridgeman v. National Basketball Ass'n, 675 F. Supp. 960 (D.N.J. 1987); and Zimmer-
man v. National Football League, 632 F. Supp. 398 (D.D.C. 1986). In the only hockey case
challenging the amateur draft, the First Circuit dismissed a complaint because personal juris-
diction over the NHL was lacking in Rhode Island. Donatelli v. National Hockey League, 893
F.2d 459 (1st Cir. 1990).
18. Under per se condemnation, applied when the court finds a "group boycott," the court
ignores all potential pro-competitive justifications because the purpose of the condemned ac-
tion is to affect prices. On the other hand, a rule of reason approach looks at the market
power of the actor and possible redeeming virtues of the alleged restraint, as well as less
restrictive alternatives.
19. Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 593 F.2d 1173, 1180 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (footnote omitted).
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University of Oklahoma (NCAA).2 ° There, the Court declined to find a
per se violation by the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA)
because the majority believed that "what is critical is that this case in-
volves an industry in which horizontal restraints on competition are es-
sential if the product is to be available at all."'2 1 However, the NCAA
Court still found an antitrust violation, under the rule of reason ap-
proach, in the NCAA's policy of limiting television appearances by
member schools.22
Using a rule of reason analysis, the D.C. Circuit in Smith held that
the draft violated the Sherman Act. The court questioned the correla-
tion between the draft and on-field competition, suggesting the existence
of a stronger relationship between competition and other factors such as
the sharing of television revenues and the ability of individual coaches.
The dissent disputed this vigorously.23
The most troubling aspect of the Smith court's opinion was an ensu-
ing paragraph in which the court stated that any procompetitive effect on
the field could not be balanced against the anticompetitive effect on the
player market.2 4 The court reasoned that NFL teams are not economic
competitors on the playing field (thus, it had concluded earlier that there
was no per se violation). As a result, greater competition on the playing
field "does not increase competition in the economic sense of encourag-
ing others to enter the market," thus "the draft's demonstrated procom-
petitive effects are nil."'  Therefore, according to the D.C. Circuit, the
20. 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
21. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 101.
22. On the other hand, it can be argued that the "group boycott" definition used by the
D.C. Circuit in Smith - "a concerted attempt by a group of competitors at one level to pro-
tect themselves from competition from non-group members who seek to compete at that
level," Smith, 593 F.2d at 1178 (footnote omitted) - is too narrow in light of the subsequent
Supreme Court decision in Federal Trade Comm'n v. Superior Court Trial Lawyers Ass'n, 493
U.S. 411 (1990). There, the Court found a per se violation even though the boycotting group
was not attempting to restrain competitors but rather sought to improve their members' mar-
ket salaries. However, I would still agree with the D.C. Circuit's conclusion that NFL teams
are not true economic competitors. Cf. Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n v. National
Football League, 726 F.2d 1381 (9th Cir. 1984) (denying single entity status to the NFL).
23. Without going into much discussion, I believe that the major flaws in the court's reli-
ance on the equalizing ability of these two factors are that (i) revenue sharing could not allevi-
ate the problems caused by such limited free agency as the NFL then had since there is only so
much a bad team can do with equal revenues without access to better players, and (ii) the
court overestimated the impact a coach makes on an untalented team.
24. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1186.
25. Id.
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anticompetitive effects on the market for players' services and the
procompetitive effects on athletic competition could not be balanced.26
I find such a statement stunning. If the court is correct, the effects on
the players' market and the effects on the field can never be balanced.
Were this the case, no procompetitive effects that increase athletic com-
petition are ever of any significance. But surely some rules that have
some negative effect on the players market are necessary for athletic
competition. These rules include suspension or expulsion for gambling 7
or drug violations,I as well as basic eligibility requirements.2 9
Just a few months after the Smith decision, the Supreme Court de-
cided Broadcast Music, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting System (BM1).3 °
In BMI, the Court permitted blanket licenses for musical compositions,
26. In Sullivan v. National Football League, 34 F.3d 1091 (1st Cir. 1994), the First Circuit
pondered whether the anticompetitive effects in one market could be balanced with the
procompetitive effects in another. Id at 1111-12. The court, which ultimately declined to
answer the question as unnecessary to its decision, called the "issue of defining the proper
scope of a rule of reason analysis [ ] a deceptive body of water, containing unforeseen currents
and turbulence lying just below the surface of an otherwise calm and peaceful ocean." Id at
1111. The Sullivan court blamed some of the outstanding confusion on the Supreme Court,
which in NCAA "considered the value of certain procompetitive effects that existed outside of
the relevant market in which the restraint operated." Id. (citing NCAA, 468 U.S. at 115-20).
The First Circuit expressed uncertainty as to "whether the [NCAA] Court was consciously
applying the rule of reason to include a broad area of procompetitive benefits in a variety of
markets, or whether the Court was simply not being very careful and inadvertently extending
the rule of reason past its proper scope." Id. at 1111 n.9. The First Circuit, before deciding
not to decide, agonized over the issue, first stating that "it seems improper to validate a prac-
tice that is decidedly in restraint of trade simply because the practice produces some unrelated
benefits to competition in another market," but then recognizing that "[o]n the other hand,
several courts, including this Circuit, have found it appropriate in some cases to balance the
anticompetitive effects on competition in one market with certain procompetitive benefits in
other markets." Id. at 1112 (citing NCAA, 468 U.S. at 115-20; Grappone, Inc. v. Subaru of
New England, Inc., 858 F.2d 792,799 (1st Cir. 1988); M & H Tire Co. v. Hoosier Racing Tire
Corp., 733 F.2d 973, 986 (1st Cir. 1984); Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum Comm'n, 726 F.2d at
1381, 1392, 1397, 1399).
27. See Molinas v. National Basketball Association, 190 F. Supp. 241 (S.D.N.Y. 1961)
(upholding the league's right to suspend - and refuse reinstatement to - a player who bet
on his team to win)
28. This is particularly true for violations of steroid abuse regulations. As steroids are
performance-enhancing drugs, their prohibition must be for the purpose of maintaining fair
on-field competition. Yet players are denied the freedom to use this means to increase their
individual market value. The only player challenge to the NFL's anti-steroid regulations was
not even on antitrust grounds, but rather on constitutional grounds, and was dismissed. Long
v. National Football League, 870 F. Supp. 101 (W.D. Pa. 1994).
29. This seemed to be a given for the Supreme Court in its ruling in NCAA when the
Court stated that "the integrity of the 'product' cannot be preserved except by mutual agree-
ment; if an institution adopted such restrictions unilaterally, its effectiveness as a competitor
on the playing field might soon be destroyed." NCAA, 468 U.S. at 102.
30. 441 U.S. 1 (1979).
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noting that such licenses, in effect, created a new product which would
not be available in their absence. Citing BMI for the proposition that
joint agreements may be procompetitive because they increase total out-
put, the NCAA Court noted that "[r]espondents concede that the great
majority of the NCAA's regulations enhance competition among mem-
ber institutions."'" In sports, such joint actions to increase competition
on the playing field would, hopefully, result in greater media attention
and overall fan interest.32
After opining that the on-field procompetitive virtues of the NFL
draft could not be considered under a balancing test, the Smith court
seemingly contradicted itself in stating that "some type of player selec-
tion system might be defended as serving 'to regulate and promote ...
competition' in the market for players' services. ' 33 This is curious be-
cause if the court is to be taken seriously in its initial statement that all
defenses based on increased on-field athletic competition are unavailing,
then even the lesser restrictive draft alternatives proposed by the court
must still be invalid since they too still impose some restraint on the
players' market while the corresponding benefit is to on-field competi-
tion.34 While the court listed a number of proposed alternatives (all of
which would still have some anticompetitive impact on the players' mar-
ket and a potential on-field competitive benefit), the court refused to
"intimat[e] any view as to the legality" of these proposals.35
Judge MacKinnon, in his Smith dissent, pointed out that competitive
equality is necessary for any sports league to survive. While the majority
did not dispute that point, it questioned whether or not the draft was
necessary to promote this balance. Although empirical data to prove or
disprove this argument is lacking because drafts have existed in all major
31. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 103. The NCAA lost, however, because the Court ultimately
found that the particular regulation in question neither created a new product nor increased
the overall volume of television rights. NCAA, 468 U.S. at 113.
32. There is little dispute that increased on-field competition benefits the league. See
Roger Noll, Attendance and Price Setting, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BusrNESs 122-23
(Roger G. Noll ed., 1974) ("aggregate league attendance will be substantially higher if several
teams alternate in winning pennants than if one team tends to dominate."); Lewis Kurlantzick,
Thoughts on Professional Sports and the Antitrust Laws: Los Angeles Memorial Coliseum
Commission v. National Football League, 15 CONN. L. REV. 183, 193 (1983) ("the creation of
competitive balance will, in turn, increase fan enjoyment"); Horowitz, Sports Broadcasting, in
GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS BUSINEss 303 (Roger G. Noll ed., 1974) ("an equal split that
strengthens some of the clubs financially without hurting others will presumably tend to equal-
ize competition, and thereby enhance the profits of all clubs.").
33. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1187 (footnote omitted).
34. These alternatives will be discussed in Part Five, infra.
35. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1187.
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sports for many years, it is nonetheless difficult to accept the trial court's
argument (endorsed by the D.C. Circuit) that "no correlation was
demonstrated between the draft and the survival of the League. ' 36 A
few examples show the significant impact of the draft. First, as Judge
MacKinnon's dissent argued, the draft preference for the Montreal
Canadians had a major impact on the National Hockey League.37 Sec-
ond, both the NFL and NBA have provided recent examples of the po-
tentially significant impact of the draft. Look, for example, at the 1989
trade between the Dallas Cowboys and Minnesota Vikings involving
Herschel Walker, one of the top running backs in the game at that time.
Few people will dispute that the high number of first and second round
draft choices Minnesota gave to Dallas in exchange for Walker was the
cause of Dallas' extraordinary rise from a one and fifteen record to the
playoffs and ultimately to successive back-to-back Super Bowl champi-
onships and of a nearly corresponding decline in Minnesota's fortunes.38
The Smith majority's alternative explanation that coaching changes have
a major impact on a team's success certainly does not explain Dallas'
turnaround as Dallas replaced the legendary Tom Landry.39 In the
NBA, the meteoric rise of the expansion Orlando Magic to the playoff
finals in 1994-95 can .be attributed primarily to the team's good fortune
of having the first overall draft pick in consecutive years (1992 and 1993)
and, therefore, of obtaining Shaquille O'Neal and Anfernee Hardaway,
the latter having been the third overall pick and acquired from Golden
36. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1183 n.46 (emphasis added). One commentator argues against the
baseball draft's impact by citing a number of star players who were not high draft choices,
such as Roger Clemens, Nolan Ryan, Ryne Sandberg and Jose Canseco. See Deborah
Spander, The Impact of Piazza on the Baseball Antitrust Exemption, 2 UCLA ENr. L. REv.
113, 143 (1994). Her conclusion, however, that "MLB teams have the same probability devel-
oping a future major league player from an undrafted free agent," Id., goes way beyond her
evidence. While there are notable exceptions, I would take a team of randomly selected first
round draft choices over one of randomly selected amateur free agents any day.
37. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1198 n.33 (MacKinnon, J. dissenting).
38. In the October 12, 1989 trade, the Minnesota Vikings traded five players, a number
one draft pick and six conditional draft picks to Dallas for Walker. Through subsequent
trades, Dallas ultimately obtained Emmitt Smith, Russell Maryland, Kevin Smith and others
as a direct result of this deal. Mike Fisher, Super Deal Was Daddy of Them AL" Cowboy's
Trade Failures Pale in Comparison to the Herschel Walker Swap to the Vikings, FORT WORTH
STAR-TELEGRAM, Apr. 21, 1993. However, not all trades of superstars for a bounty of draft
choices have the same success. See Jim Thomas, Exile from Success Mystifies Rams: 5 Years
Ago, Super Bowl Was in Sight, ST. Louis Posr DISPATCH, Sept. 8, 1995, at 1D ("Almost any
discussion of the Rams' demise begins and ends with the Eric Dickerson trade," in which the
Rams traded Dickerson in October 1987 to the Indianapolis Colts in exchange for three first-
round and three second-round draft choices).
39. Landry, ironically, was one of the star coaches cited by the Smith court as positively
affecting a team's fortunes. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1185 n.46.
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State for Orlando's top choice, Chris Webber.4" While inept drafting
and coaching can eliminate the benefits of high draft choices and while
skillful scouting and coaching can help the best teams remain on top, by
and large, the draft does promote competitive balance even if not to its
maximum potential.41 The problem lies not in the draft's failure to pro-
mote equality on the playing field but its corresponding restriction on
the freedom of amateur athletes.
The major sports leagues do not merely pay lip service to the notion
that the draft is necessary for a competitive balance. For example, in
baseball, teams forfeit or gain first round draft choices as compensation
when they sign or lose free agents. In football, teams that sign players
from the supplemental draft sacrifice choices in the regular draft.4'
One of the most compelling arguments presented by Judge MacKin-
non in his dissent is that the draft does indeed have redeeming virtues
for the players. The first benefit to some players is the status of being a
high draft choice (lower round draft choices will be discussed in Part
Five, infra).43 Even though drafted players are prevented from negotiat-
ing with other teams, the teams likewise are barred from negotiating
with other drafted players. Thus, both sides have similar restrictions.
Teams may pay greater amounts than what the free market would other-
wise dictate because of an extreme need at a particular position or be-
cause of pressure from fans to avoid losing a high draft choice.
As a New Yorker, two recent examples that leap to my mind are the
New Jersey Nets' signing of Kenny Anderson and the New York
Yankees' signing of Brien Taylor, which have had markedly different re-
sults. With Anderson, the Nets faced considerable pressure from a
number of fronts: the media, the heavy dependence on the potential
increased ticket sales (Anderson was a popular local product), the
team's weakness at his point guard position, the potential fan backlash
because of the talented players they chose not to draft (such as Dikembe
Mutombo and Billy Owens), and the need for a point guard (the offen-
sive 'quarterback') to sign early to learn the offense.44
40. Bob Remy, Questions and Answers, NEw ORLEANS TIMES-PIcAYUNE, June 11, 1995,
at C2. See also supra note 13 (describing the rise of the NHL's Quebec Nordiques through the
amateur draft).
41. The extent of which will also be discussed in Part Five, infra.
42. The arguments advanced by the MLBPA in its challenge to baseball's amateur draft
modification demonstrates the Union's concurrence as to the valuable role the draft plays.
43. In fact, given a choice between being drafted and being an undrafted free agent, play-
ers clearly seem to prefer to be drafted. See infra note 97.
44. The pre-draft drama and anticipation as to whether the Nets would draft Anderson
with the second overall pick was intense, with the local New York press often devoting multi-
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As a result, after long and drawn out negotiations, the Nets signed
Anderson to a five year, $15 million contract.45 While it is obviously a
matter of speculation, odds are that Anderson would not have received
such a rich deal outside of New York because his value would have been
significantly less without the local appeal and the pressure on Nets' man-
agement not to lose out on its gamble to take Anderson rather than the
other talented players available. The draft thus contributed to his high
salary.
The case of Brien Taylor provides equally compelling evidence. As
the number one draft choice in the nation in 1991, Taylor received daily
media attention in New York. As the Yankees had not had the first
overall choice in decades, there was considerable pressure4 6 to meet his
demands (and Taylor's race, made a factor by his mother, added pres-
sure) and Taylor eventually received a $1.55 million signing bonus, an
unheard of sum of money in a sport in which top draft picks routinely
fail to star in the major leagues and, in any event, often take years to get
there.47 The further threat that Taylor (and many other high school
pie articles to the subject on a single day. See, e.g., Dave Anderson, Nets Risk Missing Shot at
Anderson, N.Y. TIMEs, June 26, 1991. at B1; Jack Curry, Nets Dilemma: Is It Anderson or
Owens?, N.Y. TIMES, June 26, 1991, at B2. Following the Nets selection of Anderson, the
national media was quick to report the risk taken in the selection. See, e.g., Jack Curry, Nets
Take a Dare and Go for Stylish Anderson, N.Y. TIMES, June 27, 1991, at B5; Mark Heisler,
Beyond 6 Players, It's a Reach NBA Draft, L.A. TIMES, June 27, 1991, at Part C ("The No. 2
pick wound up in a palace counter-revolution, with Nets ownership bowing to pressure to take
the local favorite, stepping in at a late meeting to argue for hometown legend Kenny Ander-
son of Georgia Tech rather than Syracuse's Billy Owens."); Anthony Cotton, Johnson No. I to
Hornets, WASH. Posr, June 27, 1991 (Anderson's surprising selection by the Nets over Owens
sent "the crowd at Madison Square Garden into a frenzy over the standout from Queens.").
45. Anderson, who did not sign with the Nets until the beginning of the season, thus
missing the entire pre-season, annoyed Nets coach Bill Fitch even further by his salary de-
mands, which forced the Nets to cut two other players merely to fit Anderson below the salary
cap. Around the NBA, WASH. POST, Nov. 9, 1991, at D7 (quoting Fitch as saying "[i]t abso-
lutely stinks that here we are after going through training camp what we have to give to get a
great player like this in terms of a Jud Buecheler being gone and a Dave Feitl being gone");
Michael Arace, Rookies Face Major Adjustment to NBA, L.A. TimEs, Nov. 3, 1991, at C5
(stating that "[r]ookies holding out of camp can ruin their first pro season" and quoting one
coach as saying that Anderson "could 'lose' half to three-quarters of his rookie year making
adjustments ... because he held out of training camp.").
46. For example, even Yankees owner George Steinbrenner, serving a "lifetime" ban at
the time, publicly stated, "my people ... ought to be shot" if they failed to sign Taylor. Mur-
ray Chass, Farm Bosses Want Kuhn, but Majors Balk, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 1, 1991, at 7.
47. The Yankees drew broad criticism for the magnitude of Taylor's signing bonus. See
ANDREW ZIMBALIsT, BASEBALL AND BILLIONS 100-101 (1992) (quoting Astros' general man-
ager Bill Wood as saying, "I was disappointed ... On one side, every club has to do what it has
to do to improve, but there is sadness at the realization of the impact of the [signing] on the
industry and other clubs ... [In the past small-market teams could choose] not to slug it out in
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players) had against the Yankees was that he could drastically shorten
the traditional one-year signing period to only a few months by threaten-
ing to go to college. Once a player enrolls in a university, teams are no
longer permitted to negotiate with him. By using this threat, Taylor was
able to increase the pressure on the Yankees (as Todd Van Poppel, the
first million dollar draft choice, did with the Oakland A's a year
earlier).48
Another advantage of the amateur draft for players is that the draft
provides them with a means to determine their value relative to other
draft choices both from that year and from previous years. Players
rarely risk signing for too little money because their agents can set mini-
mum demands based on full knowledge of the relative market. An ex-
ample of this is Jeff George, the top pick by the Indianapolis Colts in the
1990 NFL draft. Leigh Steinberg, George's agent, was quoted as saying
that because of George's position in the draft, George was worth no less
than the amount the previous year's number one pick had received and
that Steinberg would attempt to begin negotiations at that level.4 9
The Smith dissent, while persuasive generally, exaggerated signifi-
cantly in arguing that "the NFL must compete with businesses and other
careers for the best graduating college players."50 While few, if any, star
athletes today choose to forego lucrative professional athletic careers to
become lawyers, doctors or non-athletic professions, for the talented
few, athletic alternatives exist. Judge MacKinnon notes that some ath-
letes are good enough to play more than one sport.5" Additionally, there
are other leagues that may offer lucrative alternatives. There are profes-
sional basketball and hockey leagues in Europe, high profile junior
the big free-market [and could always turn to the amateur draft;"] Padres' general manager
Joe Mcllvaine as saying, "[t]hat's just scary;" and Phillies' owner Bill Giles as saying, "[y]ou
look at the big picture, it's another nail in the financial coffin."). Only 10% of all minor
league players ever make the major leagues. Ild. at 106.
48. Van Poppel had insisted that he would attend the University of Texas, which scared all
of the poorer teams from wasting a pick drafting him; the defending champion A's decided to
take a chance, drafted him, offered him over $1 million and signed him. See Jerome Holtz-
man, Owners Welcome 2, Ponder Fate of 1, Cm. TRm., Sept. 13, 1991, at 9.
49. This statement was repeated by Ed Garvey, former head of the National Football
League Players Association, in a 1990 speech given at Harvard Law School.
50. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1215 (MacKinnon, J. dissenting).
51. Id. (McKinnon, J., dissenting). While this may not have been prevalent in 1979 when
Smith was decided, it has grown immensely in the last decade with such athletes as Danny
Ainge, Bo Jackson, Deion Sanders, Brian Jordan and even Michael Jordan playing profession-
ally in two sports recently and many more considering doing so.
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hockey leagues in Canada, and the Canadian Football League (CFL).52
While most players might not make as much money by pursuing one of
these alternate avenues (although some athletes, such as Raghib Ismael
in the CFL, Dominique Wilkins in Greece and a number of baseball
players in Japan, do make more than they would have earned in the
United States), the mere threat of a foreign offer is often sufficient to
induce higher offers from major U.S. sports teams.53
A BMI-type argument can be made regarding the draft. Because of
all of the media attention the draft receives - the coverage of the lot-
tery drawing in the NBA (which the NHL hopes to duplicate), the live
telecasts of the NBA and NFL drafts, the coverage of and enormous
speculation about superstars such as Eric Lindros, Brien Taylor and Pat-
rick Ewing, and the publicity the media provides to local teams concern-
ing their draft strategies and picks - the league's product is enhanced.
This extra prestige and publicity brings in extra revenues which ulti-
mately goes back to the players themselves (either indirectly because the
teams have more to spend or directly because of revenue sharing agree-
ments). Thus, the draft has independent value.
III. THE DEBATE AMONG ECONOMISTS
During the last two decades, the amateur draft has been the subject
of extensive writing, speculating and mathematical computing. To the
average fan, it seems logical that the draft helps to equalize playing
strengths. However, to many economists, the draft does not do so but
instead serves merely to distribute wealth among owners by allocating
playing strengths so as to maximize league profits.54 Gerald W. Scully
52. Leigh Steinberg, one of the most well-known football agents, dismisses the CFL op-
tion, arguing that the "CFL is frequently an unsatisfactory alternative since it restricts the
number of U.S. players that a team can sign, its pay structure is generally uncompetitive with
the NFL's scale, and the Canadian income tax laws subject U.S. players to certain adverse tax
consequences." Steinberg, supra note 1, at 623.
53. Wilkins signed a two-year, $7 million contract, the most lucrative ever for a European
player, that even he characterized as "too sweet [that he] would have been a fool to turn it
down." Ailene Voisin, 'Nique's a Greek, Wants to Finish a Hawk, ATLANrA CONSTrruON,
Sept. 12, 1995, at B2. See also Frank Blackman, Neel Not Hitting It Off With Japan; Ex-A's
DH Finds Adjustment to Baseball There, SAN FRANcisco EXAMINER, May 14, 1995, at D5
(stating that, even without a baseball strike in the United States, Troy Neel, who signed a two-
year, $2 million contract to play in Japan, "could never earn that kind of money in the U.S.").
54. This argument is analogous to the view many economists take with respect to the
effect of the former era of the reserve clause in baseball. These scholars argue that under the
reserve clause, talent was distributed no differently than under free agency. In both time
periods, talent was distributed in an optimal way so as to maximize overall league profits but
during the era of the reserve clause, the smaller-market teams received payments from the
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summarizes this position.55 He notes that while each team has an incen-
tive to be among the league's best, there is a certain distribution of win-
ning percentages that maximizes overall league profits. However, the
standard collective action problem prevents teams from acting to maxi-
mize league revenues, because such action often does not provide a cer-
tain and tangible benefit to the individual team acting.5 6 But the draft
serves to distribute players in a way that will best allocate the player
strengths and, according to Scully, internalize the externalities.57
Henry G. Demmert concurs that there are externalities that teams
often do not consider.58 Demmert argues that "the improvement of a
poor team results in benefits to the league as a whole over and above
those which accrue to that individual club. It cannot be expected that
the club will consider these external effects of its decisions in determin-
ing the level of its team's quality."59
Demmert ultimately concludes, however, that the amateur draft fails
in its attempt to distribute talent in the best way. He argues that the
actual effects of the draft are insignificant for a few reasons. First is the
way draft choices are allocated. Because teams draft in the reverse or-
der of the final standings the prior year, the worst team in the league
receives the highest pick in each round and the best team receives the
lowest pick. However, with the single exception of the first pick overall,
the best team gets talent equal to the worst team (actually, it gets one
player better each round).60 Demmert also asserts that scouting is at
least as important as draft position because of the difficulties in predict-
larger-market teams (in the form of cash sales) whereas with free agency, these payments are
made to the players instead (in the form of higher salaries). See Jeffrey A. Rosenthal, The
Football Answer to the Baseball Problem: Can Revenue Sharing Work?, 5 SETON HALL J.
SPORT L. 419, 426 (1995).
55. See GERALD W. SCULLY, THE BUSINESS OF MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL (1989).
56. See Stephen F. Ross, Monopoly Sports Leagues, 73 MINN. L. REv. 643,687 (1989) ("In
economic terms, league balance, like national defense, is a 'public good.' Although league
balance benefits all teams, no individual team has any incentive to work toward it."); Rosen-
thai, supra note 54, at 428. But see George Daly & William J. Moore, Externalities, Property
Rights and the Allocation of Resources in Major League Baseball, 19 ECONOMIC INQUIRY 77,
80-81 (1981) ("team owners are surely aware of these effects; the number of teams is not large
and, hence, free-rider effects are not inevitable; a central organization (the league) is available
to coordinate activities and prescribe allocative rules; collusion among teams is, uniquely, legal
in the industry and detection of violators of collusive agreements remarkably easy.").
57. Scully, supra note 55, at 85.
58. See HENRY G. DEMMERT, THE ECONOMICS OF PROFESSIONAL TEAM SPORTS (1973).
59. Id. at 29.
60. This is because, in a 30-team league (such as the NFL), the worst team has picks 1, 31,
61, 91, etc. while the best team has 30, 60, 90, etc. After the number 1 pick, the best team gets
30 while the worst gets 31, the best gets 60 while the worst gets 61, and so on.
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ing future success. Finally, Demmert is most critical of the marketability
of draft choices.6 As an example, he cites the NHL in the early 1970's
when the Los Angeles Kings, who had the second to worst record in
1971, had no first round draft picks until 1975 and the Montreal Canadi-
ans, the most dominant team in the league, had ten first round choices in
the three year period from 1971 to 1973.62
A drastically different opinion was expressed by George Daly and
William J. Moore. 63 Daly and Moore studied Major League Baseball
during the ten-year period before the imposition of the amateur draft in
1965 and the ten-year period afterwards. They compared the number of
teams winning pennants before and after the imposition of the draft, the
winning percentage range of teams, the dominance of large-city teams
and the amount of contracts sold or transferred between teams. While
acknowledging other possible factors for some changes (such as the de-
cline of the New York Yankees who, I believe, had so dominated play
previously as to distort potentially any reasonable comparison), 64 Daly
and Moore concluded that the draft did serve to equalize talent. They
wrote:
[t]he desire of owners to maximize their wealth provides them
with incentives to produce competitions more equal than would
result from the independent behavior assumed by the traditional
literature... It is both possible and plausible that this rules struc-
ture influenced the distribution of playing talent among teams
and, specifically, made that distribution more equal and, perhaps,
more profitable than it would otherwise have been.65
Unfortunately, there are several weaknesses in the debate among the
economists. First, they have not studied the corresponding effect of the
61. This is not true in Major League Baseball, the only sport in which draft choices are not
transferable. See MAJOR LEAGUE BASEBALL PROFESSIONAL RULES BOOK § 4(c) (1988)
[hereinafter BASEBALL RULES].
62. Demmert, supra note 58, at 36-37. Similar conclusions have been reached by other
researchers such as James Quirk and Mohamed El Hodiri ("by limiting competition for newly
recruited players, [the draft] reduces the cost to the entire league of such players... [and]
does not, however, lead to equalization of playing strengths") (James Quirk & Mohamed El
Hodiri, The Economic Theory of a Professional Sports League, in GOVERNMENT AND THE
SPORTS BUSINESS, supra note 32, at 40), and Roger G. Noll ("restrictive practices do not pri-
marily serve to control the differences in quality among teams within a league") (Roger G.
Noll, The U.S. Team Sports Industry: An Introduction, in GOVERNMENT AND THE SPORTS
BUSINESS, supra note 32, at 32).
63. See Daly and Moore, supra note 56.
64. Andrew Zimbalist, however, attributes the decline of the dominant Yankees, in part,
to the introduction of the amateur draft. Zimbalist, supra note 47, at 100.
65. Daly and Moore, supra note 56, at 84.
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draft on player salaries, the primary harm alleged. While some econo-
mists have commented or speculated about the impact, none have per-
formed the empirical research that was done in other areas. A second
major problem, as Daly and Moore acknowledge, is that there may be
alternative explanations for increased or decreased competition, includ-
ing free agency, the end of the reserve clause, ownership changes, wars
(resulting in players literally being drafted for military service), franchise
shifts and expansion. Finally, there is inconsistency in defining competi-
tion, as some economists choose winning percentage, some calculate
based upon championships won, while others look at the closeness of
individual games.
IV. PLAYER UNIONS AND THE DRAFr
Negotiations between sports owners and players' unions concerning
the draft are quite interesting in that amateur players are not always
represented by the unions. In baseball, players are not members of the
union until they reach the major league level (thus, the baseball players'
strikes have not affected minor league baseball).6 6 In the other sports,
while the unions can and do bargain with respect to amateur draftees,
the affected constituency has no voice among union membership.67 Yet,
as the Second Circuit noted in Wood v. National Basketball Associa-
tion,68 collective bargaining agreements that affect parties outside the
bargaining unit are commonplace. 69 In Wood, Judge Winter analogized
the college draft to a situation in which the union grants permission for
hiring halls to refer workers exclusively to particular employers at partic-
ular wages.70
However, the Second Circuit's analogy is not so persuasive. In the
traditional labor context, such institutions as wages, seniority and work
conditions affect all employees relatively equally, although it is true that
a wage scale in which the newest employees are paid the least harms the
newer employees who did not have a chance to participate in the union's
consideration. However, in such situations, some employees always rep-
resent that interest; in that case, the junior-most employees at that par-
ticular time represent new employees.
66. Zimbalist, supra note 47, at 179.
67. Id. at 180.
68. 809 F.2d 954 (2d Cir. 1987).
69. Wood, 809 F.2d at 960.
70. Id.
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The college draft, on the other hand, is unique in that nobody within
the union is competent to represent the amateur. Even the most junior
member of a sports union is already past the stage in which a poor agree-
ment concerning the amateur draft would affect him." Thus, there is
virtually nothing to prevent the union from giving a little extra to the
owners when negotiating about the amateur draft in return for conces-
sions in other areas such as free agency for veterans. It is no surprise,
therefore, that rookie salary caps have been enacted recently, or may
soon be enacted, in most sports. The Wood court speaks of the "duty of
fair representation,"'72 but to what extent does that apply to those who
are outside the scope of the union's current membership? Additionally,
even if there is such a duty toward amateurs, it is doubtful that any court
will strike down a collective bargaining agreement because the negotia-
tions concerning the amateur draft were not as good as they could have
been. Asking a court to measure how strongly the union negotiated on a
particular issue is a monumental, if not impossible, task.73
On the other hand, the draft is integrally related to many of the other
things that the union negotiates in the collective bargaining agreement,
particularly veteran free agency. Four potential scenarios exist concern-
ing players' negotiating rights: 1) open amateur bidding and limited vet-
eran free agency, 2) open amateur bidding and open veteran free
agency, 3) restricted amateur draft and open veteran free agency, and 4)
restricted amateur draft and limited veteran free agency. Were the
union forbidden from negotiating a collective bargaining agreement af-
fecting amateurs and, therefore, all amateurs were unrestricted free
agents, either scenario one or two would exist. Scenario two would
likely be an unacceptable situation for the owners while scenario one
would be unacceptable for the veteran players. Scenario one would re-
71. It is difficult to analyze the precise effect rookie salaries would have on veterans and,
thus, the view veteran players (who comprise the body of player union membership) take
toward amateurs. On one hand, higher rookie salaries should mean that veterans, with proven
worth, would get paid even more while, on the other hand, because team salary caps in some
sports create a "limited pie," every extra dollar going to rookies would mean one less dollar
available to veterans.
72. Wood, 809 F.2d at 962.
73. Michael S. Kagnoff ponders whether the recent NFL Agreement, with the inclusion of
a rookie salary cap, violated the NFLPA's duty of fair representation. Kagnoff argued that,
because the NFL adopted an overall salary cap for each team, the interests of veterans and
rookies became diametrically opposed in that their salaries would come out of the same lim-
ited pie. The overall salary cap for each team eliminated any need for the owners to receive a
rookie salary cap as well. The NFLPA was dominated by veterans and, therefore, had an
"unusually strong incentive to negotiate an exceptional deal for veteran players." Kagnoff,
supra note 9, at 139.
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sult in a rather lopsided situation in which only the rookies would be free
to negotiate. Such a situation could have the perverse result of escalat-
ing rookie salaries at the expense of established veterans. The alterna-
tive to that, scenario two, is unlikely since owners would not be inclined
to grant unrestricted free agency to veterans solely because rookies
would have it. Thus, the only realistic solutions to maintain some sort of
equilibrium between the owners and players (and between veterans and
rookies) involve some restrictions on the allocation of amateur players.
To reach an optimal balance between veterans and rookies, the union
necessarily would have to be the representative body in negotiations
with management.74
As mentioned earlier, Major League Baseball's draft change to ex-
tend the period of exclusivity with regard to high school players was suc-
cessfully challenged by the MLBPA. As noted, MLB has an antitrust
exemption and, therefore, is completely unaffected by Smith. Therefore,
union consent was legally unnecessary for baseball to maintain or modify
the draft. Further adding to the MLBPA's difficulty was the fact that,
unlike in other sports, baseball draftees nearly always join the minor
leagues and, therefore, are not union members.
Two challenges against MLB's draft modification were mounted.
The first was from Scott Boras, the agent responsible for many of the
high bonuses in recent years.75 While Boras had no real standing to
74. One area of litigation between players and leagues recently has been the effect on the
amateur draft of the expiration of a collective bargaining agreement. As a result of this
fiercely contested litigation during the past few years, clear case law has been developed in
that the amateur draft remains legally valid after the expiration of collective bargaining
agreements and even after an impasse is reached. In National Basketball Ass'n v. Williams, 45
F.3d 684 (2d Cir. 1995), the Second Circuit held that the NBA was permitted to continue the
terms of an old collective bargaining agreement after expiration until the parties negotiated to
an impasse, at which time "the nonstatutory labor exemption precluded an antitrust challenge
to various terms and conditions of employment implemented after impasse." Id. at 692-93
(supporting Powell v. National Football League, 930 F.2d 1293 (8th Cir. 1989)). The divided
Powell court held that impasse was still a "lawful stage of the collective bargaining process,"
Powell, 930 F.2d at 1302, and, therefore, antitrust protection remained. See also Brown v. Pro
Football, Inc., 50 F.3d 1041, 1056-57 (D.C. Cir. 1995), cerL granted, no. 95-388, 1995 WL
555467 (U.S. Dist. Col., Dec. 8, 1995) (nonstatutory labor exemption shielded NFL from anti-
trust liability in imposing pre-impasse proposal on developmental squad players after an im-
passe was reached). The Brown court observed that the players retained the option of de-
certifying their unions, the option chosen by the NFLPA after Powell, if they wished to invoke
the protections of the Sherman Act. Brown, 50 F.3d at 1057. This same option sharply di-
vided the NBA players during their 1995 collective bargaining negotiations with the league
before a new agreement was ultimately accepted.
75. According to one owner, the new baseball rule was known informally as the "Scott
Boras" Rule because of his representation of the top pick in each of the previous three drafts
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bring a complaint against MLB, the second challenge was in the form of
a grievance filed by the MLBPA. Attempting to gain standing even
though it did not represent amateur draftees, the MLBPA crafted a
clever argument that the use of draft choices as compensation for the
signing of veteran free agents thereby affected the MLBPA's members. 6
Because free agency was part of Major League Baseball's collective bar-
gaining agreement, the union argued that the union had standing to ob-
ject to any owner action affecting free agency. The MLBPA then argued
that the owners' draft modification affected free agency because it in-
creased the value of a first-round draft choice (because owners would be
more likely to sign such draft picks, possibly at lower salaries) and,
therefore, negatively affected the free agent market because a team
would not be as willing to sign a free agent to a lucrative contract if it
had to forfeit a more valuable draft choice than under the previous sys-
tem. An arbitration panel agreed.77
V. DRAFT PROPOSALS
A brief summary of the mechanics of the four major drafts would be
helpful at this stage. Major League Baseball conducts a 60-round draft
in which graduating high school players, college juniors or seniors, and
those who have completed two years of junior college are eligible.78
Teams retain rights to draftees for one year or until a player returns to
college, whichever is shorter.79
The NBA draft is open to any player whose high school class has
graduated.80 The draft is only two (soon to be one) rounds.8' Exclusive
rights to drafted players are retained for one year.8 2 Any player with
remaining college eligibility who enters the draft may return to college
(and continue to play college basketball) within 30 days of the draft, and
the drafting team would then retain his rights for an additional year be-
yond the expiration of college eligibility. 3 The one-year period of exclu-
and his negotiation of over $1 million for each. See Bob Nightengale, Padres Update, L.A.
TiMws, Sept. 22, 1991, at C-13B.
76. Spander, supra note 36, at 132-33.
77. Id. at 132-33.
78. Id. at 115.
79. Id. at 116; BASEBALL RULES, § 4(e).
80. NBA AGREEmENT, Art. IV, § 1(h).
81. NBA AGREEmENT, Art. IV, § 1(a); Chass, supra note 3.
82. NBA AGREEMENT, Art. IV, § 1(c).
83. Layden, supra note 4, at 14.
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sivity is also tolled during any period in which the draftee plays in
another professional league.84
The NFL has a draft of seven rounds and is available to those players
whose classes have completed at least three years of college, absent a
"hardship" petition. Those who still have remaining college eligibility
must renounce that eligibility before they may be drafted.8 5 Drafting
teams retain exclusive rights for one year, a period that is extended to
three years with respect to draftees who play in another professional
league. 6
Finally, the NHL draft is open to all players 18 years of age and
older.8 7 Teams retain exclusive rights to draftees for one year, except
that such an exclusive period (i) shall be two years if a draftee plays
junior hockey thereafter and (ii) is tolled with respect to those players
who attend college or play on an Olympic or National team. 8
Major League Baseball is the only sport that prohibits the trading of
either draft choices or the assignment of the exclusive right to negotiate
with draftees.89
The court in Smith suggested ways for the NFL to modify its draft,
but curiously, did not consider the validity of any of its own proposals.
The court first proposed a scheme whereby multiple teams could draft
each player and each team would have a limited number of players it
could sign.9° The problem with such a proposal is that quality varies
significantly among players. Limiting each team to signing ten players is
not a viable solution if one team can sign ten of the best players and
other teams are left with ten of the poorer ones. However, if players
could be ranked without a draft system (which would be difficult, be-
cause the draft itself determines the ranking - a player only has high
value if a particular team needs his skills after factoring in intangibles
such as attitude, health, size and speed), a free negotiation system could
be developed whereby each team may sign only a few players in each
84. NBA AGREEMENT, Art. IV, § 1(c).
85. NFL AGREEMENT, Art. XVI, § 2; Layden, supra note 4.
86. NFL AGREEMENT, Art. XVI, §§ 4(b), 5.
87. Collective Bargaining Agreement between the NHL and the National Hockey League
Players' Association (NHLPA), § 16(B)(2) (June 1, 1988) [hereinafter NHL AGREEMENT].
The author was unable to locate the most recent NHL agreement, but believes that the terms
of the previous agreement are still applicable.
88. NHL AGREEMENT, § 16(B)(5).
89. See BASEBALL RULES, § 4(c); NFL AGREEMENT, Art. XVI, § 7; NBA AGREEMENT,
Art. IV, § 2; NHL AGREEMENT, § 16(B)(7).
90. Smith v. Pro Football Inc., 563 F.2d 1173, 1188 (D.C. Dir. 1978).
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ranking group (and the worse a team is, the more higher ranked players
it could sign).
A possible alternative could be to assign points to a player based
upon where he is drafted (i.e. - 1000 points to a top draft choice and 10
points to a 7th round pick). Teams would draft through the normal
means; however, teams would not have exclusivity but rather would be
entitled to negotiate with all picks. Teams would then only be permitted
to sign players up to an allocated total amount of points. For example,
the worst team could sign 5000 points worth of players while the best
team could get only 2000 points. This would achieve the desired result of
distributing talent and would permit players to be ranked (and would
establish their relative value) while allowing free negotiation.91
The second proposal offered by the Smith court is that a college
player could negotiate freely with any team if he does not receive an
acceptable offer.92 This seems quite impractical. First, how is an accept-
able offer to be determined? Because there are so many factors in addi-
tion to salary, such as length of contract and payment guarantees, it
would be impossible to determine objectively an acceptable offer. Quite
often, it may be the player's demands which are unreasonable (after all,
a team is not going to waste a high draft pick on a player whom it does
not value highly and is not willing to pay well). While independent arbi-
tration works in baseball, it does so because the arbitrator must only
choose between a team's one-year offer and a player's one-year offer.
The arbitrator does not, and probably cannot, determine unilaterally the
"fairness" of a particular complex offer. Such a system would be further
impractical with respect to new players because, unlike baseball players
in arbitration disputes, the drafted player has no professional statistics
from which his value can be determined by a neutral party. If an in-
dependent arbitrator cannot possibly decide the fairness of an offer, the
determination certainly cannot be left to the parties involved, thus leav-
ing this idea of the Smith court completely unworkable.
A third proposal was to hold a second draft for players who did not
come to terms with their original clubs. 93 This may have some merit but
many problems as well. Were there many players who did not sign, a
secondary draft could be held whereby each team would receive a pick
91. This will be discussed at greater length in the Part Six, infra.
92. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1188.
93. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1188.
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in the respective round of its unsigned player.94 If there were a sufficient
number of players in each round, teams could pick from the players in
that round that other teams could not sign. But unless there were
enough such unsigned players, the problem would exist whereby a team
has the undesirable choice between selecting a player at a position that it
does not need to fill or a player of significantly lower ability.95
The fourth proposal was for a draft of fewer rounds.96 This is what
both the NBA and NFL did, and it seems to be a reasonable step. How-
ever, legally speaking, from the individual player's perspective, there is
no difference between the first round draft choice who can only negoti-
ate with one team and the eighth round draft choice who can only do
likewise. If the draft is invalid as a restraint of trade for the reasons the
Smith court gave, a shorter draft restraining the trade of fewer players
should be equally illegal. But, if one is looking for a more practical solu-
tion, this is a good one. A high draft choice may have special status and
leverage that often goes with his draft position, while the same is gener-
ally not true for a lower pick. Furthermore, players drafted in the lower
rounds have little more chance of making a team than players who are
undrafted and try out as free agents. For those people, the draft is help-
ful because it gets them on a roster with a bona fide chance in training
camp to make a team, but hurts them because if they are subsequently
released (as most are), it is often too late to try out for another team.
Were these marginal players free agents from the start, they might have
been better able to determine where they would have had the greatest
opportunity of making a team.97
94. It would be unfair, of course, to open this secondary draft to teams that had already
signed their pick in the relevant round.
95. Suppose, hypothetically, that four teams fail to sign their first round picks (these being
the first overall pick, a quarterback, the tenth pick, a linebacker, the eleventh pick, an offen-
sive lineman, and the twenty-eighth pick, a running back). Allowing each of these four teams
to re-draft these players would result in the worst team getting a player no better than tenth
best and a linebacker instead of the needed quarterback.
96. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1188.
97. An argument against a shorter draft is that these marginal players seem to prefer to be
drafted rather than be undrafted free agents. See Layden, supra note 4, at 106 (quoting the
brother of Baylor star Brandell Jackson as saying, "[w]hen he didn't get picked, it was one of
the worst moments of my life"); Donnie Webb, Job Candidate Gets Nice Plug for His Resume,
ORANGE INSIDER, June 1, 1995, at 20 (stating that former Syracuse linebacker Dan Conley
was disappointed not to be drafted); Mike Zizzo, Defense Earns Mee Playing Time: Darnell
Mee's Improved Offense Also Helps Earn Him a Starting Spot with the Hooters and Has Him
Looking Forward to Next Week's NBA Draft, ORLANDO SENnINEL, June 24, 1993 (quoting
Mee, a United States Basketball League player and potential second round NBA draft choice,
as saying, "I feel better about the draft, but confident would be a strong word. Anything can
happen draft day, so I'm not getting my hopes up too much.").
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A shorter draft makes the most sense especially in the NBA, where
rosters are quite small. To some extent, it is also well suited for the NFL
because there are relatively few roster spots available each year. But in
baseball and hockey, with their extensive minor league systems and a
large number of years before most prospects reach the major leagues (as
well as the small percentage of high draft picks who actually develop as
expected and reach the majors), 98 more rounds are needed. Tryouts for
free agents do not make as much sense when these players would not yet
be playing for the major league team anyway. Furthermore, in baseball,
there are only nominal signing bonuses for all but the very top players
and minor league salaries are equal among players at each level so the
draft clearly serves to divide the talent rather than assign players to one
specific team for the purpose of salary negotiations.
The final proposal of the Smith court was to eliminate the draft and
employ revenue sharing to equalize teams' resources.99 But even reve-
nue sharing alone is not sufficient. Certain cities are more attractive to
players (because of media publicity, weather, living conditions, etc.) and,
as the Smith court itself argued, one ought not forget the impact of
coaches. If coaches have as great an effect on a team's success as the
D.C. Circuit apparently believed, then a player draft is even more neces-
sary to balance the effect of coaching and maintain parity in the league.
The recent baseball change received much publicity in the media; the
majority of writers opposed baseball's modification but generally ac-
knowledged that a system in which Todd Van Poppel, a certain top
choice, went to the World Champion Oakland A's rather than to a bad
team and in which the Houston Astros, the worst team in the majors that
year, failed even to sign its top draft choice, was flawed.100
The baseball situation poses an interesting dilemma. On one hand,
since the purpose of the draft is to assign more talented players to the
worst teams, if those teams lose their top players to colleges or if they do
not draft the best available players because it is "safer" to select players
they are more likely to sign (the wealthier, more competitive teams are
better positioned to gamble on the Van Poppels), the objective of achiev-
ing competitive balance will not be attained. 101
98. Only one minor leaguer in ten ever plays major league baseball and only one in fifty
remains in the majors for at least six years. Zimbalist, supra note 47, at 106.
99. Smith, 593 F.2d at 1188.
100. See Billy Sample, Amateur Draft Rule Flirts With Disaster, USA TODAY BASEBALL
WEEKLY, Apr. 1-7, 1992, at 15.
101. In recent years, the "signability" of players has become an important factor to be
considered by teams in using their top selections. See Mark Maske, Notebook, WASH. POST,
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It seems that baseball should design some other system in which
clubs that fail to sign a player receive an extra pick the following year the
same round in which the unsigned player was selected. This extra pick
should be in the same position within the round as the lost pick, rather
than at the end of the round. That way a competitive balance can still be
achieved without severely restricting the freedom of high school players.
This proposed system of compensation for failure to sign a player would
also have the desired effect of not forcing clubs to overpay for the Brien
Taylors and Todd Van Poppels. This is because if a team does not suffer
so greatly from failing to sign its first pick, it would face less pressure to
overpay that player. Players would not be able to use the college threat
to exact greater compensation. The loss suffered by deferring the reali-
zation of the draft choice for one additional year, however, is probably
enough incentive for teams to present reasonable offers to their draftees.
Another proposal could require high school players to declare them-
selves "in" the draft, as the NBA and NFL now require of college under-
graduates. Only such players could then be drafted. This would prevent
the Todd Van Poppel situation. However, the problem with such a sys-
tem is that unless there were an agreement with the NCAA whereby an
"in" declaration would make a player ineligible for college ball, all play-
ers would declare themselves "in" and then decide what to do. On the
other hand, a binding "in" declaration would tilt the balance significantly
in the favor of owners, as the players who opt in would have little choice
but to sign.
Any attempt to eliminate the eligibility of any high school baseball
player who had declared himself "in" the draft would likely face legal
challenges, such as those faced by the NCAA on a few occasions from
football players. The most notable of these challenges is Banks v. Na-
tional Collegiate Athletic Association (Banks I1).1° Banks, a student at
Notre Dame, renounced his final year of eligibility to enter the NFL
draft, was not drafted, and unsuccessfully sued to be able to resume play-
June 7, 1992, at D5 (discussing "signability" as being a key issue in the first round of the 1992
amateur draft and how two players (Charles Johnson and John Burke) represented by agent
Scott Boras, known as a hardline negotiator whose players often fail to sign contracts, were
drafted far below their projected positions; Maske quotes an unnamed baseball executive as
saying, "[o]f course Boras was a factor with the Miami kid [Johnson]. Nobody wanted to deal
with Boras."). See also Zimbalist, supra note 47, at 100 ("some people are concluding that
these high prices are undermining the poor team's ability to rely on the amateur draft and
their farm systems to develop competitive teams. Poor teams will no longer be able to afford
first-round picks.").
102. 977 F.2d 1081 (7th Cir. 1992).
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ing at Notre Dame.10 3 The NCAA, as defendant, argued to the district
court that "a clear line of demarcation between amateur and profes-
sional athletic pursuits" was necessary for "the integrity and quality of
college football." 104 Assuming this represents the policy of only the
NCAA, the court's agreement seems reasonable. However, were this
position actually the result of an explicit agreement between the NFL
and the NCAA, the antitrust analysis of the joint action might have com-
pelled a much different result. Even the district court in Banks noted
that were it to decide differently, NFL owners would be displeased be-
cause of the havoc it could wreak on the draft and because it could tilt
the relative bargaining power significantly toward the players. 05
The NFL prefers to require college students to renounce their eligi-
bility because, in doing so, players foreclose the primary competitor for
their football talents and thus minimize their leverage. Were juniors to
be drafted and then be allowed to return to college, the system of re-
warding the worst teams could be thwarted and salaries would necessar-
ily escalate for those players who have the added leverage provided by
that option (as in baseball, where worse teams must consider not only
the best available athletes, but their likelihood of signing those players).
An acceptable solution might be for younger players to be permitted to
apply for the draft without renouncing eligibility and for the drafting
teams to retain their rights to those players until graduation. That way,
the Braxton Banks of the world would not be shut out altogether, while
players would not be able to use the NCAA as a pawn against NFL
teams.
VI. PROPOSAL AND CONCLUSION
No single draft proposal could work perfectly for each of the four
major sports because each is somewhat unique. For starters, for the rea-
103. See also Gaines v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 738 (M.D. Tenn.
1990) (agreeing with district court in Banks in denying relief to a former Vanderbilt University
football player).
104. Banks v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass'n, 746 F. Supp. 850, 861 (N.D. Ind. 1990)
("Banks I"). Banks I concerned Banks' unsuccessful attempt to obtain a preliminary injunc-
tion. Thereafter, Banks filed an amended complaint seeking a permanent injunction, which
the district court dismissed and the Seventh Circuit affirmed in Banks IL
105. Banks I, 746 F. Supp. at 861, n.13. There seems to be little doubt that the NFL
prefers such a policy. See Layden, supra note 4 (quoting New York Giants Director of Player
Personnel Tom Boisture as responding to an inquiry as to whether the current policy will be
changed by saying, "Are you kidding"). Colleges also seem to prefer the current system.
When asked if the system should be changed, Baylor coach Chuck Reedy responded, "[t]hat
would mess up everything." Id.
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sons already discussed herein, I believe the Smith case is a poorly rea-
soned decision.10 6 Although economists disagree with each other, there
appears to be substantial evidence that professional drafts are meant to
be, and succeed in being, a major factor behind the competitive balance
in sports. The earlier dominance of the Montreal Canadians, by virtue of
their draft preference in hockey, and the New York Yankees and Brook-
lyn Dodgers, when baseball lacked a draft, among other things, provides
strong evidence in favor of a competitive draft. The fact that draft
choices are often major parts of trades and are forfeited as compensation
for signing free agents provides further evidence that the stated intent of
the owners for the draft to preserve competitive balance is not mere lip
service.
However, the Smith decision is helpful to the extent that it prohibits
unilateral owner action and, therefore, encourages negotiation between
the owners and the players (other than in baseball, of course).10 7 The
recent baseball modification, struck down by an arbitration panel thanks
only to its questionable endorsement of the union's crafty argument,
provides an example of the potential dangers which exist when both (i)
owners are not required to conduct their draft in accordance with collec-
tive bargaining agreements with the players and (ii) the antitrust rule of
reason inquiry is inapplicable.
106. Smith, incidentally, was criticized by the Second Circuit in United States Football
League v. National Football League ("USFL"), in which the Second Circuit rejected Smith as
inconsistent with Wood. USFL, 842 F.2d 1335, 1372 (2d Cir. 1988). Unfortunately, while I
agree that the reasoning of Smith should be rejected, I believe that the Second Circuit was
wrong in its conclusion that Smith and Wood are inconsistent. As discussed earlier, Wood
upheld the NBA draft as being subject to the non-statutory labor exemption as a product of
collective bargaining while in Smith, the labor exemption was inapplicable because Yazoo
Smith was drafted before the NFLPA became the exclusive bargaining agent for purposes of
the exemption. Compare Wood, 809 F.2d at 961-62 with Smith, 593 F.2d at 1177 n.11, and
Smith v. Pro Football, Inc., 420 F. Supp. 738,742 (D.D.C. 1976). Wood is not inconsistent with
the D.C. Circuit's opinion cited by USFL, but is only inconsistent with dicta in the District
Court's opinion in Smith that states that even if there were a collective bargaining relation-
ship, the amateur draft was not a mandatory subject of bargaining so as to fall within the labor
exemption. Smith, 420 F. Supp. at 742-744. The Second Circuit, however, only cited the D.C.
Circuit opinion in Smith as being inconsistent with Wood; since the D.C. Circuit never ren-
dered an opinion as to the District Court's dicta, the Second Circuit therefore was in error in
claiming inconsistency. In fact, quite the opposite of what the USFL court believed, the Wood
court agreed generally with Smith in assuming that "in the absence of a collective bargaining
relationship with a union representing the players, [the draft] would be illegal." Wood, 809
F.2d at 959.
107. Although, as I argued earlier, all leagues should be permitted to implement their
own draft rules, so long as the sum of all pro-competitive effects outweigh the totality of anti-
competitive effects under a rule of reason analysis. The Smith decision, unfortunately, pre-
vents the leagues from unilaterally implementing virtually any restraint.
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My first (and minor) proposal for a draft is that it should be of lim-
ited duration. For basketball and football, the draft should be for as
many rounds as roster spots are generally available each year to rookies.
If only six rookies make an average NFL club each year, there is no
reason to have a longer draft (although shorter might still be appropri-
ate). However, the length of the draft would not really matter were my
second proposal to be adopted.
My major proposal, as mentioned briefly earlier, is to hold a normal
draft that does not convey negotiating rights. Instead, the draft should
be used to assign relative point values to each player. Each team would
be given a total number of points that it would be permitted to sign and
that value would vary according to team performance the previous year
(as mentioned earlier, for example, the worst team might be allocated
5000 points while the best might be given 2000 points). Thus, the worst
teams would have enough points to permit them to sign a few star play-
ers, while the best teams would be able to sign one, at the most. 08
Teams could negotiate freely with all players but could only sign players
up to a given value. Such a system would be better suited to benefit the
worst teams than the current system which only gives one extra pick to
the the worst teams than to the best teams. Rather than trade veteran
players for draft picks, as under the current system (in all sports except
baseball), teams could trade these players for points.
Baseball and hockey could use similar point systems to ensure that
one team does not hoard talent, while allowing players some choice as to
where they go. Furthermore, were baseball to have such a system, its
failed effort to implement the recent change would be irrelevant because
no team would suffer the loss of an individual player choosing to enter
college. The worst teams would still have the chance to sign the greatest
amount of talent and would not have to fear drafting an unsignable
player. Similarly, the NFL and the NBA would not have to fear under-
classmen declaring their eligibility and then attempting to go back to
108. There are a few ways to ensure that players were appropriately ranked. First, teams
should have an independent incentive to draft the best players early in the draft because of the
fear that if a star player were assigned a low point value, the best teams could sign him without
losing many points and, thus, defeat the goal of achieving a competitive balance. A way to
ensure that players are drafted (and thus ranked) in the true order in which they would nor-
mally be selected would be to grant a percentage point discount whenever a team signs a
player it has drafted. For example, if a player who has been assigned a value of 1000 points
according to the position in which he was drafted signs with the team that drafted him, per-
haps only 900 points would be deducted from that team's point limit. By having such a dis-
count, teams would draft the players they want so as to obtain this discount that would
otherwise be available to an opponent.
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college; allowing these students to be drafted while freely retaining the
option to return to college would thus resolve a problem that has
plagued underclassmen for years.
This system appears to have many of the benefits of distributing tal-
ent without having the primary drawback of restricting the players mar-
ket. Players could negotiate freely and sign with any team, but teams
would be limited in the amount of talent they could sign. Additionally,
unlike proposals such as those in which multiple teams could draft an
individual player or in which teams would be limited in the total number
of players signed, this proposal would limit the total value of the players
drafted and signed.
In summary, this proposal should benefit teams by (i) eliminating the
chance that they would risk forfeiting top draft choices if unable to sign
them, (ii) reducing the leverage top draft choices have over teams by
making available substitute high draft choices with whom teams could
negotiate, and (iii) providing a greater selection of players with whom to
negotiate. It would benefit players by (i) giving them free choice and (ii)
allowing them to be drafted while retaining the option to return to col-
lege without a loss to any party.
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